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Abstract
In their statement from December 2016, the independent commission of experts for strengthening investment 
in Germany, appointed by then-Federal Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel, calls for a significant expansion 
of investment dynamics in Germany. Along with proposed measures to strengthen private investments, the  
commission stresses the importance of creating the kind of institutional and political framework needed to 
push public investments so as to not endanger welfare and economic growth in Germany.
In light of this, this study shows what effects an increase and stabilization of the public investment level in 
Germany would have. To do this, distinct investment scenarios have been created and their impact on a number 
of economic and politico-economic indicators up to the year 2025 was measured.
The results clearly show that an increase in public investments in Germany would lead to a significant rise  
in German GDP growth over the following years. Factors like productivity, volume of work and the state’s  
capital stock similarly show higher increases in scenarios with more public investments relative to scenarios 
with a lower investment level.
Another important result of the study is that such a proposed rule of investment would not have to be in conflict 
with the already existing debt rule of the federal government. Although scenarios with a higher level of public 
investment first lead to a lower budget balance, the differences between the individual scenarios become insi-
gnificant over time due to both the higher economic growth in those scenarios with more investments and the 
underlying assumptions regarding the counter-financing of these investments. In all five scenarios observed, 
the debt / GDP ratio swiftly falls below 50 percent in the year 2025.
For the purpose of this study’s calculations, additional investments will be financed through an increase in 
taxes and a cut in spending on public consumption. The focus of this paper is purely macroeconomic, taking  
a look at the effects of different levels of public investment on the German economy.
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Introduction
public investment in Germany asserted in a recent state-
ment that: “Despite the additional expenditure in pub-
lic investment, deficiencies remain in both private and 
public investment” (Expertenkommission 2016: 6). In 
its assessment of public investment levels, the commis-
sion recommended that the government establish a budg-
etary commitment to public investment that would off-
set the depreciation of public assets over a certain period. 
Pointing to the present budget surplus, the commission 
recommended this be slated primarily for public invest-
ment in the areas of education, research and development 
(Expertenkommission 2016).4
This study focuses on the macroeconomic effects a bind-
ing government commitment to public investment levels, 
as advocated by the commission, would have. At the same 
time, this study addresses the issue of budgetary fiscal  
sustainability. If we don’t wish to overly burden future 
generations with debt, it makes little sense to effectively 
increase this burden through other means, that is, through 
the failure to undertake public investments. Debt legisla- 
tion – that is, expenditure concerns – alone cannot ensure  
fiscal sustainability. Instead, public assets must be secured  
for present and, above all, future generations. Failing to 
undertake public investment will only increase this burden. 
Investment underpins growth and employment in any 
economy, so establishing this kind of “regulation for stabi-
lizing public investment levels” could reinforce this foun-
dation for future generations as well. In a modern econ-
omy, investments are key to enabling and strengthening 
economic growth, and thus increasing the prosperity of 
society. Technological advances, entrepreneurial success, 
the creation of qualified jobs – they would all be impossible 
without modern capital stock. If Germany is to sustain its 
ability to offer prosperity and employment for future gen-
4  In its statement, the commission of experts also discussed building 
up a potential “investment reserve” that could be formed in periods 
featuring an “unforeseen budget margin” for financing long-term  
investment projects (Expertenkommission 2016).
While some of its European neighbors are still feeling 
the after-effects of the debt and structural crises, Ger-
many appears to have come out the other side relatively 
unscathed. Economic output has grown by more than 
twelve percent since 2010, unemployment is at its low-
est level since reunification, and the budget – in addition 
to having been successfully consolidated – is actually gen-
erating a surplus. But once you factor in other macroeco-
nomic values, these encouraging developments give way to 
far less promising signs. In terms of future growth and the 
prosperity of future generations, Germany is draining more 
and more of its public capital stock. 
The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW; 
German Institute for Economic Research) has calculated 
an average investment gap of three percent of Germany’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the years 1999 to 2012, 
or €75 billion per year (Bach et al. 2013).1 In one analysis, 
the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK; 
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Indus-
try) point to a cumulative investment gap of over €600 bil-
lion between 2003 and 2012 (DIHK 2014).2 Figures from 
the Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (Difu; German Insti-
tute for Urban Studies) indicate an apparent local author-
ity investment shortfall in the order of €136 billion for 2015 
(KfW-Kommunalpanel 2016). 
Convening in August 2014 under then-Federal Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Energy Sigmar Gabriel, an independ-
ent commission of experts3 tasked with preparing con-
crete recommendations for action to strengthen private and 
1 Here the investment gap for Germany is measured as the difference 
between investments in the eurozone and investments in Germany 
(relative to GDP).
2 The DIHK study measures the German gap (relative to GDP) in com-
parison with 17 industrialized countries.
3 The independent commission of experts consists of 21 members rep-
resenting a broad cross-section of business, society and science. It is 
headed by Prof. Dr. Marcel Fratzscher, President of the German Insti-
tute for Economic Research. In April 2015, the commission of experts 
presented a report in which it expressed its intent to provide support 
for the implementation of its recommendations and its desire to help 
advance investment activities in Germany (Expertenkommission 2015).
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erations, it must invest in tomorrow – today. This is where 
public funds play a particular role. 
A current study, commissioned by Germany’s Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy, highlights the positive effects 
of public investment. The authors of the study show that 
investment in infrastructure, in all-day schools and nurs-
eries, and in universities increases overall levels of eco-
nomic production, employment and fiscal sustainability 
(Krebs und Scheffel 2016). 
But turning to the public investment levels in Germany 
reveals a far from satisfactory picture. For more than ten 
years, the rate of public net fixed capital formation – 
defined as gross fixed capital formation minus depreciation 
– has been pegged at around zero. Since 2012, it has been 
consistently negative (see Figure 1), which points to stag-
nation and a deterioration of public capital stock.5 In light 
5  Here it is important to note that there is some controversy around 
conclusions drawn solely on the basis of public net fixed capital for-
mation. The reasons are, first, the statistical depreciation rules used, 
Figure 1: Trend of public investment as a percentage of GDP
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Source: Own representation based on Federal Statistical Office (2016: 58).
National accounts – working documents on investments.   
of this, it is clear that we need to be more diligent in stabi-
lizing public investment as a legally enshrined counterbal-
ance to debt rules.6 
The first section of the study provides examples of config-
uration options for rules regarding the investment of public 
funds. The next step estimates the macroeconomic effects 
of each option in scenarios calculated up to 2025. Finally, 
the key findings are summarized with an outline of the 
challenges in establishing such a rule for the stabilization 
of public investment. 
and second, the difficulty of interpreting this data where prudent pri-
vatization leads to a reduction in public investment. One example of 
this comes from Austria, where authorities outsourced the motorway 
and highway network to the Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen- Fi-
nanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft (ASFINAG; Motorway and Highway 
Financing Corporation).
6  For a discussion of the stabilization of public investment, see also En-
derlein und Pisani-Ferry 2014; in their report for Sigmar Gabriel and 
Emmanuel Macron they call for a “minimum speed for investments” 
in Germany that is in line with the debt brake, with the goal of retain-
ing the value of public assets (Enderlein und Pisani-Ferry 2014).
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Method
and the trend GDP, and correspondingly reduced in the 
event of a negative gap. 
Scenario 4b, “anti-cyclical”: For a negative/positive output 
gap, the additions/deductions in public investment are an 
inversion of those in the “pro-cyclical” scenario. 
These assumptions result in various paths of public invest-
ment (Figure 2). 
In the “OECD average” scenario, pegging the investment 
quota at 3.3 percent would lead to a considerable future 
increase in public investment. In the “business as usual” 
scenario, the investment quota is fixed at just 2.2 per-
cent. The growth of investments is significantly lower, but 
still positive overall. The “business as usual” scenario is 
also the scenario that most closely follows the progression 
of the “basic” scenario in the VIEW calculation model (see 
box, p. 11).7 In the “stagnation” scenario, in which public 
capital stock remains constant, public investment shows a 
slight decline because there is also a slight reduction in the 
amount of depreciations over time. 
The progression in the two supplementary scenarios – 
“pro-cyclical” and “anti-cyclical” – is volatile due to the 
economic trend component. In the pro-cyclical scenario, 
the average level of public investment is at around the level 
of the “OECD average” due to the current positive output 
gap. For the anti-cyclical scenario, on the other hand, the 
volume of public investment is considerably reduced – also 
a result of the positive output gap. 
For the two supplementary cyclical scenarios it should be 
noted that these investment rules would also result in dif-
ferent stimuli if they proceeded from a different economic 
point of departure. If we were to find ourselves in a situa-
7  For ease of comprehension, the results presentation in Chapter 3 ex-
cludes the “basic” scenario. However, the results for the “business as 
usual” scenario more or less equate to the results for the basic prog-
nosis in VIEW.
If government commitment to public investment were 
introduced as proposed by the commission in its statement 
on strengthening investment in Germany, what macro- 
economic effects would this generate? To answer this ques-
tion, this study examines five different scenarios in which 
the level of obligatory public investment follows various 
different principles. Prognos AG’s macroeconomic model 
VIEW was used to calculate the effect on the economy (see 
box, p. 11). Here, the observation horizon for the individual 
scenarios stretches to 2025. 
The following five scenarios examine various configuration 
options for regulations, whereby the sole subject of the  
scenario in each case is public investment. The individual 
scenarios are based on the following assumptions: 
Scenario 1: Implementation of an investment quota equiva-
lent to the OECD average (excluding Germany) for the years 
2005 to 2014 (“OECD average” scenario). The investment 
quota here corresponds to the public gross fixed capital  
formation relative to GDP. 
Scenario 2: Implementation of an investment quota that 
corresponds to the average for the years 2005 to 2014 in 
Germany (“business as usual” scenario). 
Scenario 3: An investment rule in which gross invest- 
ments correspond to depreciation, that is, the public  
capital stock stagnates at the current level (“stagnation” 
scenario). 
Supplementary scenarios 4a and 4b: Investment rules 
that correspond to the “business as usual” scenario, but 
expands to include a simplified economic trend component. 
This involves both a pro-cyclical and an anti-cyclical vari-
ation. 
Scenario 4a, “pro-cyclical”: In the event of a positive out-
put gap (current GDP/trend GDP >1), public investment is 
increased to half the difference between the current GDP 
11
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Figure 2: Volume of public gross fixed capital formation, by scenario, in real prices (2010), bn euro
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
The Prognos VIEW global economic model
VIEW is a prognosis and simulation model that consistently depicts the future development of the global economy.  
It considers the 42 most important countries in the world based on economic performance and thereby encompasses  
over 90 percent of global economic output. 
In VIEW, the public investment expenditure simulated in the context of this study takes effect through different channels 
that correspond to the rules it implements. In essence, the model first defines the planned (permissible) structural budget 
balance in such a way that it results in a debt ratio of around 60 percent in the long-term. Where a scenario foresees the 
planned expenditure of the state increasing due to increased public investment, this is financed through spending cuts in 
public consumption and an increase in tax rates so that the planned budget balance still corresponds to target. The alloca-
tion of reciprocal financing to spending cuts and increased tax rates generally equates to 50 percent. For taxes, there is a 
distinction made between indirect taxes, direct taxes from private households and direct taxes on companies. The public 
investments lead on the one hand to a greater public capital stock with a positive effect on productivity, on the other hand 
to a decrease in consumption opportunities for private households. These changes lead to further feedback effects, thus 
expanding the stimulus’ reach throughout the economy. In the short term, this can lead to deviations between planned and 
actual budget balances, because it is precisely on the income side that the reference values (disposable income, nominal 
GDP) can change. Moreover, VIEW makes no distinction between the level of authority for the investment (federal, state, 
local authority). 
A detailed description of the model can be found on the Prognos AG website at: www.prognos.com/publikationen/ 
weltreport/modell-view/. 
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tion with a negative output gap (current GDP below trend 
GDP, see Figure 3), this would result in a far more favorable 
progression in the “anti-cyclical” scenario than that seen 
in the calculations below. 
Moreover, the economic trend components can be arranged 
so that the resulting spread of public investment volumes 
would be weaker than that shown in Figure 2. Similarly, 
the cyclical components – simplified for purposes of cal-
culation – could be expanded to include further rules, such 
as a minimum investment volume. In the “anti-cyclical” 
scenario, in particular, this would lead to a more “realis-
tic” progression of the resulting public investments and 
prevent the collapse of investment volumes around 2020. 
As this study is intended to represent the widest spec-
trum of scenarios possible, it deliberately uses a somewhat 
broader range of cyclical investment stimuli. The advantage 
of this approach is that we can more clearly see the poten-
tial impact that a hypothetical major decline in investment 
Figure 3: Negative and positive output gaps
would have on other economic values. At the same time, 
both cyclical scenarios should be seen as supplementary 
and are therefore only shown as dotted lines in the follow-
ing figures. 
Output
Over time
GDP trend
Current GDP
Positive output gap
Negative output gap
Source: Own representation  
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The slight decline in GDP growth that appears in every sce-
nario between 2018 and 2020 can be traced back to the 
underlying basic scenario in the model (not included in the 
graph). The “business as usual” scenario is the closest to 
the basic prognosis that underpins the model (see Chap-
ter 2). Here we proceed from the assumption that global 
economic framework conditions will deteriorate slightly 
in the period in question. However, the progression of the 
basic scenario is of little relevance for interpretation of the 
findings presented below, as the proportional differences 
between the scenarios would be similar even if we were to 
assume, for example, consistent GDP growth. 
Closely related to growth of the GDP is the productiv-
ity trend. This is more evident in the scenarios with higher 
public investment quotas (Figure 5). This means the higher 
rate of GDP growth here isn’t solely attributable  
The presentation of the findings highlights the effect on 
the GDP, as well as the implications for the state and for tax 
rates. A selection of further effects is also shown. 
Effect on GDP and expenditure  
components
Increased public investment has a positive effect on GDP 
growth (Figure 4). In the “OECD average” scenario, GDP 
growth is markedly higher than in the “business as usual” 
and “stagnation” scenarios. With their economic trend 
components, the two supplementary scenarios present a 
far more volatile progression. A view of the average growth 
rates reveals that the differences are not as dramatic as the 
graph might suggest. 
Figure 4: Change in GDP, real (2010) prices, in percent p.a.
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
14
Balanced Budget and Investment Rule: Two Sides of the Same Coin?!
to the investments made on the demand side, but also  
to an increase in work productivity due to better capitali-
zation. 
The scenario-specific configuration of public investment 
also has an impact on the growth in private consump-
tion (Figure 6). For all scenarios, this is initially less pro-
nounced in the period prior to 2020. Like the previously 
described progression of the GDP, this can be attributed to 
the basic scenario underlying the model. At the same time, 
it shows that growth in private consumption in this period 
is higher in those scenarios in which there is less invest-
ment. One reason for this is that the resulting lower tax 
burden on private households encourages greater con-
sumption expenditure. From 2021, on the other hand, 
growth is higher in those scenarios where there is greater 
investment. The reason for this is the income effect from 
the higher economic growth in these scenarios. Moreover, 
catch-up effects due to reduced consumption could play a 
part in the period up to 2020.  
The development of private consumption offers the same 
correlation as for private consumption. Where public 
investments are lower, the state initially has more options 
for consumption at its disposal (Figure 7). This is the situ-
ation in the “stagnation” scenario, for example, as well as 
the supplementary “anti-cyclical” scenario. For public con-
sumption, the contrast between the different scenarios is 
markedly stronger than for private consumption. Here, too, 
it is plainly evident that a higher public investment quota 
at the OECD level can lead to greater growth in public con-
sumption in the long term, here from 2022. 
When considering overall investment, it becomes appar- 
ent that this too increases as public investment grows  
(Figure 8). This can be attributed in part to the fact that 
public investments represent a component of aggre-
gated economic investments. In the past, public invest-
ments together represented around eleven percent of over-
all investments. In addition, a public investment stimulus 
leads to various feedback effects, which can – depending 
Figure 5: Change in hourly productivity, real (2010) prices, in percent p.a.
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
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Figure 6: Change in private consumption, real (2010) prices, in pecent p.a.
Figure 7: Change in public consumption, real (2010) prices, in percent p.a.
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Scenarios:   “Business as usual”         “OECD average”       “Stagnation”         “Pro-cyclical”         “Anti-cyclical”  
Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
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Abbildung 8: Change in total investment, real (2010) prices, in percent p.a.
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Abbildung 9: Net exports, real (2010) prices, in bn euro
100
150
200
250
300
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Scenarios:   “Business as usual”        “OECD average”                  “Pro-cyclical”         “Anti-cyclical”  
Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
Scenarios:   “Business as usual”        “OECD average”                  “Pro-cyclical”         “Anti-cyclical”  
Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
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on the scenario in question – either strengthen or weaken 
private investment overall. This means that public invest-
ments stimulate positive effects for the overall economy 
and so contribute to an improved investment climate for 
private investors. Moreover, public investments often com-
plement private investments and thus strengthen them.  
It also becomes evident that the effect of a public invest-
ment stimulus, initially quite strong, weakens over the 
course of time. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
change in public investment assumed by the scenarios  
develops a much greater dynamism in the years prior to 
2020 than in the years after (see Figure 2). Second, this 
once again reflects the influence of the underlying basic 
scenario, which assumes a similar weakening in the growth 
of aggregate investments to that seen in the “business as 
usual” scenario. 
Looking at net exports it becomes clear that the effect on 
exports and imports occurs in interaction with the visible 
impact (Figure 9). In scenarios with higher public invest-
ments, net exports are temporarily lower than in the com-
parative scenarios. This is partly because increased invest-
ments – particularly in the short term – lead to an increase 
in imports of intermediate goods. 
But is also explained by the fact that the investment  
stimulus barely has an impact on exports in the short term. 
In scenarios with higher public investment due to more 
favorable productivity trends, and thus unit labor costs,  
it is only over the long term that we see a somewhat higher 
rate of exports. Overall, however, the differences between 
the scenarios in relation to the cumulative net exports is 
not significant. The reason for this is the mirror-image 
progression of scenarios before and after 2020. This means 
that a greater investment stimulus would presumably lead 
to a somewhat more volatile progression of net exports. 
Effect on public budgets
An increase (decrease) in public investment is associated  
with higher (lower) expenditure. However, in order to  
keep the state’s planned budget balance at a level that can  
be achieved with a decline in the government debt ratio, 
reciprocal financing occurs through corresponding adjust-
ments in public consumption and in tax rates (see box,  
p. 11). The findings presented in this section are therefore 
highly dependent on the model specification of reduction 
of the government debt ratio. Meanwhile, in the short term 
– depending on the configuration of financing – there is a 
direct impact on the actual budget balance and the state’s 
debt levels. 
Prior to 2020, the budget balance is greatest in the supple-
mentary “anti-cyclical” scenario, at almost one percent 
(Figure 10). In this scenario, state expenditure is particu-
larly low due to low investment. This effect is not entirely 
offset by the flatter progression of GDP development. It is 
only later that the budget balance drops below that of the 
other scenarios. A mirror image of this correlation is seen 
in the “OECD average” scenario as well as the supplemen-
tary “pro-cyclical” scenario. 
While a lower budget balance has an inhibiting effect on the 
reduction of the government debt ratio, overall there are 
only minor differences between the various scenarios (Fig-
ure 11). In every scenario, there is a rapid reduction of the 
present debt ratio to under 50 percent in 2025, in line with 
the model definition in VIEW (see box, p. 11). 
In relation to the state’s capital stock, the correlation 
between scenarios is clear. In the “pro-cyclical” and “OECD 
average” scenarios, there is a pronounced increase, while 
the capital stock in the “business as usual” scenario only 
exhibits slight growth (Figure 12). In the “stagnation” sce-
nario, the capital stock remains consistently in line with 
targets, while a contraction of capital stock can be observed 
in the supplementary “anti-cyclical” scenario. Here, in 
18
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Figure 11: Nominal government debt ratio, as percentage of GDP
Figure 10: Nominal budget balance, as pecentage of GDP
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Source: Prognos 2016  
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Figure 12 : State capital stock, real (2010) prices, in bn euro
parts, there is an immense difference in absolute deviations 
between the individual scenarios. In the event of an invest-
ment quota at the OECD level, the Germany of 2025 would 
have over €650 billion more in capital stock than for the 
supplementary scenario of anti-cyclical investment activ-
ity. In comparison to a continuation of existing German 
investment levels, too, the introduction of an investment 
rule at OECD levels would still lead to an almost €300 bil-
lion increase in capital stock by 2025. 
Impact on tax rates
In the model calculations, higher public investments are 
funded by higher tax revenues, among other things. In the 
“OECD average” scenario and the supplementary “pro- 
cyclical” scenario, the quota of indirect taxes increases by 
about 0.3 percentage points (Figure 13). 
For direct taxes – the tax rates affecting private house-
holds (Figure 14) and companies (Figure 15) – a similar 
picture emerges. The rates increase in those scenarios that 
assume an expansion of public investment. In the scenarios 
with constant or decreasing public investment, on the other 
hand, tax rates remain almost constant, or decline. How-
ever, here it is important to note that the differences are in 
the region of just 0.5 percentage points.8  
Other effects
Along with the findings depicted, it is also interesting to 
note the impact on work volumes as well as the inflation 
rate. Here it can be seen that an increase in public invest-
ment also leads to an expansion of the work volume (Figure 
8  It is also apparent that there was a considerable increase in company 
tax rates between 2010 and 2012 – to 9.5 percent. This increase is pri-
marily a return to pre-2009 levels, that is, prior to the considerable 
drop in company tax rates caused by the financial crisis.
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
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Figure 13: Indirect tax GDP ratio, in percent
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Source: Prognos 2016  
Figure 14: Private household tax rates 
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Figure 15:  Corporate tax rates
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
Figure 16: Volume of work, in bn hours
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Figure 17:  Inflation rate (change in deflator of household final consumption expenditure), in percent p.a.
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Cyclical scenarios are dependent on the state of the economy; values through 2014 based on real figures; values after 2014 based on model calculations.
Source: Prognos 2016  
16). This applies despite the induced productivity increase. 
The additional investment goods must be created; they are 
then only partially exported abroad. This effect is particu-
larly pronounced in construction investment, which entails 
both a high work intensity and a high domestic value crea-
tion share. 
The increase in working volumes by 2020 or so, common to 
all the scenarios here, and the subsequent fall, is attribut-
able to economic development but even more so to demo-
graphic development. According to the population trend 
for the coming years that underpins the model, there will 
still be an absolute increase in population in the working 
age between 15 and 64 before a decline sets in around 2019 
(in the VIEW model the second variant is based on the 13th 
coordinated population projection of the Federal Statisti-
cal Office). 
Inflation rate effects are also rather clear. Public invest-
ment requires a temporary increase in the inflation rate 
(Figure 17). Depending on the scenario under observa-
tion, the difference in the mid-term is around 0.3 percent-
age points. This can essentially be traced back to the start-
ing situation with a positive output gap. In this situation, 
well-utilized capacities also turn greater demand into posi-
tive price effects. Toward the end of the observation period, 
on the other hand, the inflation rate is consistently around 
2.2 percent. This means that there is no long-term impact 
on changes in price levels to be observed. 
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Conclusion
The calculations of the individual scenarios clearly indicate 
that legally binding public investment levels above the  
current level in Germany would lead to a relative increase 
in economic growth in the coming years and thus have a 
palpable, long-term effect on the macroeconomic growth 
path. 
However, the differences in the effect of the individual 
investment paths are considerable. The simulated average 
GDP growth ranges between 1.6 percent p.a. in the “OECD 
average” and “pro-cyclical” scenarios and 1.2 percent p.a. 
in the supplementary “anti-cyclical” scenario. For the 
“business as usual” and “stagnation” scenarios, the aver-
age growth rate amounts to 1.5 and 1.4 percent p.a., respec-
tively. Meanwhile, factors such as productivity, the volume 
of work and the state’s capital stock exhibit clear growth in 
scenarios with higher investment quotas relative to scenar-
ios with lower quotas. 
A further key finding of the study is that an investment rule 
needn’t conflict with the government’s existing debt rule in 
any way. While the scenarios with higher investment quo-
tas initially lead to a lower state budget balance, the differ-
ences between the individual scenarios level off in the long 
term. The reason for this is the parallel increase in eco-
nomic growth as well as the form of reciprocal financing 
that underpins the model. In all of the scenarios observed, 
the model specification, which has the present debt ratio 
rapidly decreasing to less than 50 percent in 2025, can be 
implemented without significant negative effects on con-
sumption and economic growth. 
Nevertheless, removing reciprocal financing doesn’t mean 
that additional public investment will be available for free, 
either. Higher investment quotas are accompanied by mod-
erately higher tax rates. Initially, then, it is private house-
holds and companies that bear this burden. However, 
the trend of private consumption also shows that posi-
tive income effects in the case of higher public investment 
in the mid-term lead to dynamism in private consump-
tion above reference levels, so that private households also 
profit in such a scenario. 
From a methodological point of view it should be noted  
that the impact on individual investment paths is also  
dependent on the form of financing chosen (see box,  
p. 11). Changes to the financing model would change con-
crete progressions without imperiling the long-term effect. 
Moreover, we can assume that in reality, the impact would 
depend to a large extent on the type of public investment 
as well as the level of government involved (federal, state, 
local authority). This cannot be examined in the scenarios 
with aggregated investment stimuli. Moreover, in its state-
ment the commission of experts pointed out that capac-
ity and skills shortages mean that funds made available are 
often not applied where they are actually required. It was 
not possible to further elaborate these aspects in this study. 
Finally, the role of the present output gap in progressions, 
particularly the two supplementary scenarios “pro-cycli-
cal” and “anti-cyclical,” should be emphasized. Under dif-
ferent economic conditions and a more complex configura-
tion of cyclical components, these investment regulations 
would also lead to different stimuli. In the “anti-cycli-
cal” scenario, in particular, it is clear that a straightforward 
configuration of such a regulation can lead to extreme and 
unrealistic investment paths and that further components 
would therefore have to be enhanced. Along with these 
methodological comments, at this point it is important 
that we also consider the political feasibility of a commit-
ment to public investment levels. As the commission state-
ment rightly notes, such an obligatory investment regu-
lation is accompanied by numerous budgetary and federal 
challenges. Which investments would be affected by such a 
rule? How would special assets be treated? What role would 
the states and local authorities be accorded if such a rule 
were implemented (Expertenkommission 2016)? 
Even if all these questions cannot be wholly answered at 
present, it is essential that weak and therefore negative 
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trends in public net investment be offset with solutions.9  
A budgetary commitment from the state is one such solu-
tion. When considering the numerous challenges with 
which the country is confronted – including the effects  
of demographic change, the integration of refugees as well 
as the lack of investment in Germany’s competitiveness as 
a business location – it is clear that we need to pursue the 
issue of stabilizing public investment levels and its possi-
ble macroeconomic effects. This study is a contribution to 
that discussion. 
9 For further discussion on the future of investment in Germany, see 
Thöne and Krehl 2015.
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s compared with many of its European part ‑
ners, Germany is currently in a good 
eco nomic position. But looking solely at 
economic growth is deceptive. Growth 
in recent years has not been inclusive, as participa‑
tion opportunities have become increasingly une‑
qually distributed. This puts social cohesion at risk. 
But what might policies that achieve both goals
—realizing growth potential and expanding partici ‑
pation opportunities—look like? As a part of its 
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project, the Bertelsmann Stiftung develops and 
discusses concrete recommendations for an inclusive 
growth model. Using current research as a basis, 
this discussion paper discusses the degree to which 
the entrepreneurial activity of immigrants and 
people with a migrant background are today already 
serving to drive inclusive growth in Germany, and 
how potential of this kind can be identified.
The conditions rendering it possible to engage in entre‑
pre neurial activity in a country have a direct effect 
even beyond that country’s national economic perfor‑
mance. Who founds companies and who does not, 
and the degree of sustainability displayed by the com‑
panies founded, says much about how participation 
opportunities are distributed within a society. Are 
conditions such that groups that still lack full equality 
of opportunity within economic processes, such as 
women, young people, and people with an experience 
of immigration or a migrant background, are able 
as businesspeople to become pace‑setters for a suc‑
cessful economy? Or is their potential overlooked 
and unused? What specific obstacles are in place? 
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